It seems important to insist on the perspectivism that pertains to the functional limitation on the infinite regression of metalanguages (see Note Dec. 2 and 3) in lieu of a recieved postmodernism that we so easily fall back on, that everything is textual, that every act is a coded form of structural unevenness determined by social structures beyond our influence. My thought is: However true that might be, it seems necessarily indemonstrable, and thus, like an argument for the divine inspiration of the Bible, it is best ignored. But it is nonetheless a pervasive tendancy to relativize to such a degree that before the words are even articulated, one has already concluded that one's statement is at best meaningless and at worst an alibi for abuses of power. Yet this paralyzing relativism is possible only if one is able actually to relativize everything, which would require a kind of total and immediate knowledge or absolute subject position, which if possible, would refute relativism tout court . This postmodern brand of relativism requires that one occupy an absolute position, which is why Nietzsche called this type of relativism "bourgeois" and why I call it "libertarianism," which is in most instances synonymous with white supremacy.

Additionally, the paranoiac brands of this form of relativism must assume that while they themselves have no access to an absolute position and thus must wander blindly, the institutions of power do occupy such a position. Thus such figures as the State, Ideology, the Police, the Terrorist, etc. appear monolithic and unary, unassailable foes of a paranoic belief in the possibility of a singular and total knowledge.

The point of relativism is, rather, to think of structure as something personal, as something we are (rather than something we "embody"), to try to discover its pointsof articulation between a pure, yet-to-be-articulated potentiality and an existing, shared cultural object. Even if we are more or less expressions of determinate structures (if that concept even has any meaning), we are poor conduits for power and are given over to such contingencies and perversions as to be threateningly inefficient for the exigencies of power. Though, it isn't unreasonable to assume that we are compelled to dream up and produce robots and cyborgs as versions of ourselves without the frictions of ignorance, forgetting, laziness, resentment, and resistance. It's remarkable then that our fictions often represent the converse: that robots desire human freedom instead of seeing us as poor media for a now-fully compiled ideology.

But the brand of relativism I am tacitly promoting comes down to a belief that structure is not separate from what is structured. To think structurally, which however fictitious is still necessary, requires either that structure exists elsewhere from that which is structured or that structure is ontologically equivalent to the stuctured even if it is simply a perspective effect due to the impossibility of transcendence or, rather, the immanance of transcendence.

In such a case, rules would belong to the ruled or to the same order as the ruled and not to a transcendent elsewhere--though that doesn't rule out the likelihood that the ruled knows that it rules the rule. For instance, never have I found a satisfactory answer to the questions: Where are the laws of physics? Of what are they composed and how are they transmitted immediately to every substomic particle in the universe? What laws govern the elements comprising the laws of our universe? If the composition of laws (as themselves lawless) is fundamentally different from that which it governs, how does one control the other? By what mechanism? It seems more likely that the laws are imminent, and if so, then they are subject to laws in turn, laws equally imminent and likely, at some point in the causal chain, dictated at least in part by the very things legislated. 

Rule must be something itself ruled that is in turn misrecognized as a rule by whatever it is that submits to that rule. What is implied in this statement is that there are some things that are rules for the rules as things ruled. And in a system without an objective exterior (in which "outside" is merely a logical category brought about by misrecognition, a persective effect), it can be assumed that the rule is at some point ruled by its ruled. Obviously, that is cold comfort to the ruled who resist, but it gives the lie to the rule insofar as the rule can be delegitimized and resisted in the same stroke. But as Lacan noted, knowledge is paranoiac: For the ruled to know that they rule what rules them would negate the significance of the rule, immediately rendering absurd that supposedly liberatory knowledge. Do the ruled have more to lose than just their chains? Do they risk also their very being?

Improvisatory and provisional, regularity is a product of the contingency of laws. One might ask, Well, if current laws have no ground, what keeps them from being replaced by other laws? Our reply should be: Exactly that groundlessness. Alternative laws would be equally arbitrary, so what exits obtains, what happens to be appears necessary simply for the reason that it happens to be; any alternative seems no better or worse except for the very simple but surprisingly effective fact that it lacks existence. Existence is the only quality that what exists has over what does not exist, and this is sufficient for things to remain as they are and not to change.

It is only because the groundless ground of the rule is, at least in part, the ruled that what is a law is violable on the grounds of its imperfect self-legitimization via the ruled. In the same sense that profit is not blatent wage theft but the difference in the social average of surplus labor, rule is protected by the complexity of its dependencies, a complexity made mind boggling by the lack of an absolute vantage point. There is no single protocol for the disconnection of rule, and that is the secret of rule: to diversify its dependencies to the point that they can never be totalized into a single target. Possibly, what I am describing is simply what Deleuze called "control." Regardless, it's possible, being curt, to say that differance is the structure of rule.